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International Multifoods2 – A
It was a beautiful summer afternoon in downtown Minneapolis, Minnesota.  High above the skyline, on the 49th floor of the
modern Multifoods Tower building, Devendra Mishra was being welcomed aboard as President of the Vending Services of
America company (VSA).  VSA was a major subsidiary of the diversified food company, International Multifoods Corporation
(IMC), and Tony Luiso, CEO of IMC, was leaning over his desk with intensity as he said, “Devendra, you have the right
background for this task.  You will probably straighten out VSA’s IT problems in six months.”  The former President of VSA
had recently left under pressure and Devendra had been recruited to revitalize the company and restore its profitability.  Afternine
years of continual growth and profitability, VSA’s business had seemed to hit a wall.  Symptoms of serious problems were
beginning to surface:  costs were increasing and margins declining; there was some erosion in the small independent operator
customer base, an indication of customer service problems; inventories were increasing while sales seemed to be stagnating.
Within VSA and IMC, the consensus was that poor design and implementation of a new centralized management information
system was the root cause of these woes.  
Devendra was taking a cut in salary to come to VSA, but he saw it as an opportunity to run a $1 billion business and his chance
to “make a mark” in turning around a large business.  He was energetic, ambitious, and had been delighted when offered the job.
Devendra came to VSA from Technicolor, Inc., where he enjoyed an excellent reputation as an innovator and leader.  There he
had started three new business ventures, all of which were successful.  Although his distribution experience had largely been in
the entertainment industry, at Live Entertainment, Inc., he and the people at IMC felt that this experience, combined with his
expertise at market and problem analyses, were just what was needed at VSA.  He had been chosen after a national search
involving screening of more than 1,200 candidates and careful evaluation of  15 of them.  With an MBA from a leading business
school, Devendra was a polished, articulate manager who made an excellent impression.  He exuded intelligence and confidence.
Prior to his entertainment distribution experience, Devendra had been at RCA, Inc.  There he had met Bob Maddocks, who now
was Senior Vice President of Human Resources at IMC.  At RCA Devendra had been known as an innovative manager who was
excellent at working with people and initiating successful change.  Maddocks supported the selection of Devendra as President
of VSA.  When Luiso offered Devendra the job, he put the central challenge of fixing the stalled new management information
system as follows:  “Devendra, you’ve implemented systems before.  We obviously haven’t had the management expertise for
a project like this.”
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Before accepting the job Devendra had done his homework on the vending distribution segment of the food service distribution
industry.  He knew it to be a low margin business (2% to 3%) with little value-added beyond plain old good customer service.
The life blood of the business was service.  On the other hand, costs had to be managed very carefully.  It wasn’t just a business
where pennies counted; it was a business where mils counted.  A powerful information system that would impose discipline
uniformly across the dispersed operations made good sense.
Now he was at the moment of truth.  He had to understand how these basic vending distribution principles were working
specifically at VSA and he had to get started getting that information system back on track. 
CORPORATE AND INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
International Multifoods Corporation
IMC got its start in the late 1800’s as International Milling Company, Inc., a midwest-based flour milling company, distributing
flour and related baking products to bakeries, grocery stores, hotels, and restaurants.  Over many years, bakery product growth
and acquisition of a variety of food product, food service product, and food service distribution businesses led the company to
become one of the leading food product and food service distribution firms in the United States.  
By the 1980’s, IMC food products businesses included grain, milling, and retail consumer food products, agricultural feeds, and
related agricultural products.  The company had significant operations in Canada and Venezuela as well as in the United States.
IMC also owned Mister Donut, a franchised doughnut chain, and the Boston Sea Party restaurant chain.  IMC food service
distribution businesses consisted of VSA and Pueringer.  Pueringer was a manufacturer and distributor of food products and
ingredients to pizza and some other specialty restaurants.
IMC management had decided that the future of the firm should be in the manufacture and distribution of products to food service
operators.  The growth and success of VSA was a significant factor in reaching this strategic decision and VSA became
increasingly critical to IMC’s strategic thrust as the company entered the 1990s.  Indeed, by the early 1990s, a corporate
restructuring was underway and the company was divesting its interest in firms outside of the food service distribution business
while acquiring new firms to add to its VSA food service distribution company.  Still, the company retained diverse interests, and
in the early 1990s, IMC was the Number 1 producer of bakery mixes in North America and Venezuela; the Number 1 producer
of consumer flour and retail bakery flour in Canada; the Number 1 distributor of food products to the U.S. vending industry; and
the Number 2 distributor of food products to independent pizza and Mexican restaurants in the U.S.
In its FY 1992 and FY 1993, respectively, the company earned $23 million and $41 million on sales of $2.3 billion and $2.2
billion.  However, in the Fiscal Year ended February 28, 1994, shortly before Devendra arrived at VSA, IMC had incurred an
annual loss of $13.4 million.  Much of this loss was attributed to write down of underperforming assets and costs associated with
closing and reorganization of certain U.S. and Canadian facilities, as well as the disposition of some unprofitable assets.
Management hoped that these painful changes would enable a profitable future for IMC.  But the company’s lack of consistent
performance and on-going restructuring was producing increasing pressure from stockholders and the financial community to take
significant steps toward improving shareholder value.  There was a growing sense that the firm did not have a sufficient strategic
focus and management was pondering whether the time had come to focus the company in a specific industry, either bakery
products or specialty food service distribution, the two principal businesses remaining at IMC. Food service distribution
companies enjoyed higher price-earnings stock multiples than bakery products and the company’s investment banking advisors
were strongly recommending that it fully concentrate on this part of the business.  Leadership and success of the VSA company
would have to be the basic underpinning of such a strategy.  So, VSA’s performance was critical both operationally and
strategically.
Summary organizational and financial information for IMC are given in Exhibits A and B.
VSA and the Food Service Distribution Industry
Vending Services of America was acquired by IMC in 1984.  Started by two brothers, VSA was an entrepreneurial venture begun
in the 1970s.   The brothers grew the company both through internal growth and the quiet, steady acquisition of small vending
service firms throughout the West and Midwest United States.  At the time of its acquisition by IMC, VSA was a pioneering, but
regional, supplier to the vending food service segment in the U.S.  The brothers continued to run VSA after its acquisition by IMC,
Teaching Case:  International Multifoods
591
growing the firm to become a national player in its industry.  In the eight-year period from 1985 to 1993 VSA grew from $200
million to $900 million in sales.  By 1994, VSA operated 20 distribution centers, served 18,000 accounts, stocked 12,000 items
system wide, and was among the largest buyers of Mars, Hershey, Nestle, and Nabisco products.  An overview of the VSA
organization when Devendra arrived in 1994 is shown in Exhibit C. 
The bulk of IMC’s food service products, for use in restaurants and bars (so called “finger foods”), were distributed not by IMC
but by SYSCO, the largest food service distributor in the U.S.  SYSCO was 10 times the size of VSA and Pueringer combined.
SYSCO was a “broad-line” distribution firm, in that it delivered to all types of food services operations, including hospitals,
prisons, government offices, and schools, as well as restaurants, including pizza restaurants.  IMC’s more narrow focus in VSA
and Pueringer put it in the market segment referred to as “specialty food service distributors.”  The VSA vending distribution
business was of no great concern to SYSCO, but the Pueringer distribution to pizza restaurants, though small, was a point of
friction between SYSCO and IMC. Competition between SYSCO and IMC within this market eventually led to difficulties in
achieving distribution of IMC non-vend products through SYSCO.  IMC’s decision to divest its food service product
manufacturing business and focus entirely on food service distribution relieved this major point of tension between the two firms.
As IMC was beginning to focus on food service distribution, a controversy was brewing with regard to the future of the vending
industry.  In 1994 consumers spent $22B on vending products sold through 4.5 million vending machines in 1.2 million locations.
The vending industry consisted of several large and thousands of small vending machine operators, which owned and maintained
machines in manufacturing plants, office buildings, schools, hospitals, and military bases.  Some argued that the vending industry
was dying and that its long-term future was in jeopardy due to the decline in manufacturing jobs, changing consumer preferences,
and possible substitution of vended food with other food distribution methods, including quick service restaurants and convenience
stores.  Also, warehouse clubs were increasingly serving small vending operators, in competition with distribution companies like
VSA.  Another major problem was the manufacturers who had direct distribution to the vend operators, precluding the need for
food service distributors; these manufacturers included Frito Lay (snacks) and soft drink bottlers such as Pepsi and Coke.  Further,
vending was an industry with virtually no barriers to entry due to the simplistic nature of the technology and operations involved.
(For information on the vending industry, see Exhibit D.)
Still, Devendra and VSA management were optimistic about the future of the vending industry and their company.  Fundamental
social changes in the U.S. were leaving less time available for meal preparation and greater demand for convenient access to
prepared foods.   The shift from a manufacturing to a service economy offered vending future growth potential in professional
services settings such as educational and medical institutions.   Furthermore, the quality of vended products was improving, due
to advances in technology, longer shelf life of products, and reduced time-to-vend for food items.  In addition, VSA could improve
margins by the distribution of higher margin vended snack foods and pastries.
Despite market potential, however, it was clear that the challenge of VSA realizing significant growth was substantial.  
VSA CHALLENGES
The vending service distribution business had two dominant characteristics:  small margins and a heavy reliance of personalized
relationships between the distributor and the vending machine owners.  These characteristics had given rise to a fragmented
cottage industry of 9,000 vend operators with 70% of those operators representing 10% of industry retail sales.  These small
operators provided personalized service, incurred almost no overhead, and had little in the way of fringe benefits for their
employees who were low-paid as well.  Although VSA’s sales volume had been growing faster than the vending industry in total,
for the fiscal year end February 28, 1994, sales had actually declined, primarily as a result of the loss of a number of small vending
operator accounts.  VSA competed in this market by managing in a very decentralized way with each distribution center operating
on an independent basis.  Its margins, however, were coming under increased pressure as its wage and benefit costs began to
reflect being a large company and as the costs of the more centralized mode of operating associated with the new information
systems produced more overhead expenses.  The increasing trend in VSA’s fixed and variable costs, as well as information
regarding sales and net margins, are presented in Exhibit E.  Overall, VSA had a cost disadvantage of at least 1% to 2% when
compared to low overhead regional competitors, while at the same time it was not providing a significant differentiation relative
to its smaller competitors.  The economies of scale that should have been associated with being a national distributor were not
being achieved by VSA due to inability to seriously exercise its purchasing power and the poor condition of its information
systems.  Fixed costs, such as warehouse equipment and maintenance, were growing, and VSA cost centers, such as customer
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service, information systems, finance, price management, warehousing, and transportation, were reporting consistently rising
expenditures.  The result was high break-even sales levels for the VSA business.
In addition to increasing costs, the VSA organization was experiencing morale problems.  The company had never quite regained
the enthusiasm and vigor it had when it was led by its entrepreneurial, acquisition-minded founders.  Their successor had seemed
intent on more central bureaucracy and control and the effect had been to create isolationism and friction between various parts
of the company. 
The general managers of the Distribution Centers, each of which had the title of “Division General Manager,” were vital to the
success of VSA.  Historically, they had operated with great autonomy, which assured excellent customer service and local
responsiveness.  They were as available and flexible as their smaller, more local competitors. But autonomy of the Distribution
Centers also made it difficult for VSA to realize economies of scale.  Consequently, a superstructure to control sales, purchasing
and marketing had emerged over time.  The net result of the cost of this superstructure was lower margins but no major revenue
enhancement.  VSA did have something to offer larger national vending operators such as Aramark, Canteen, and Service
America, but some two-thirds of its business was with local vending operators.  Moreover, because of their market power, VSA’s
margin on its business with vending operators was about 60% of the margin of the so-called “independents.”
The Renaissance information system aimed to fix all this.  The goals were to provide VSA with the ability to realize economies
of scale but still provide responsive local service.  As VSA management tried to gain control of costs and concentrate on the
development of Renaissance, the Division General Mangers were feeling increasingly alienated from the company.  Headquarters
management in Denver was becoming more top heavy and demanding.  The General Managers were not involved in Renaissance
design and tensions were mounting.
Renaissance
By the time Devendra arrived in his new post as CEO, IMC had invested nearly $20 million  in VSA to install “the most advanced
system available in the industry.”  The goal was to “leverage VSA’s strength and consumer knowledge in assisting its customers.”
The new Renaissance system would support a central sales order staff with state-of-the-art order entry, inventory control and
market data to better manage such key variables as product freshness, manufacturers’ promotion and rebate programs, product
turnover trends and customer usage history.   Internally, Renaissance would transform VSA from a set of businesses with differing
business practices and information system capability into an integrated company, enabling the economies of scale that had proven
so elusive in the vending business thus far. Externally, it could provide information to the small independent accounts that would
assist them in both placement of their machines and improving product selection.  In addition, it would facilitate the integration
of new acquisitions and restore growth and excitement for the business.
VSA had not historically applied or utilized information technology as a competitive weapon. Prior to Renaissance, VSA had
consistently lagged behind the industry in its IT budget, spending less than .2% of revenue per year on technology, compared to
the .5% to 1% spent by competing wholesale distributors.  Information technology was not well understood by top managers and
Information Services was viewed as an expense, not a strategic asset.  IS resources focused on operations, technical support, and
continuous hardware upgrades. User participation in systems-related decisions was largely absent and internal systems
development projects had been limited in focus. VSA had slipped behind its competition in information technology, generating
significant customer and user frustration.  The mission of the Renaissance initiative, therefore, was to “re-engineer our business
systems to support our near and long-term success as a competitive, profitable company.”
Renaissance was an elaborate and difficult project because it would be an integral part of all of VSA’s business processes. The
project was orchestrated and managed with the assistance of a major consulting firm, which advised VSA management with regard
to the system design and eventually oversaw its development and implementation.  Renaissance included four major system
modules:  inventory management, sales and marketing, outbound logistics and financial management.  The plan was to implement
these modules with the oversight of a VSA top management steering committee, a project manager, project support staff, technical
staff, and key managers and MIS representatives from each of the major functional support areas within corporate VSA.  
The Renaissance system architecture was highly centralized, with order taking (telesales), warehouse “pick” schedules, billing,
inventory planning, procurement, and all essential information processing functions occurring centrally in Denver.  Each
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Distribution Center would be connected via a 56KB data communications line to headquarters; at each Distribution Center, there
would be workstations for receiving, traffic, and warehouse management.  All transactions would flow into and back out of the
central systems where they could be analyzed and used to more effectively and consistently manage the business.  In this way,
customers, suppliers, and the VSA operations “connecting” suppliers to customers would all make use of an integrated and
homogeneous computer and high speed communications network.  Information describing Renaissance is given in Exhibit F.
The benefits expected from this system architecture were considerable in terms of reduced operating expenses and improved
customer service.  For example, by centralizing the order process, VSA could support phone-based ordering with 60 to 80 people
instead of the current workforce of 140 scattered across the 20 distribution centers.  Workforce reductions in purchasing,
operations, and administration were also anticipated.  Better information was expected to result in improved pricing control,
inventory control, and rebate management.  In all, the net benefit of Renaissance was projected to be nearly $25 million over a
five-year period (see Exhibit G).
Implementation Plan
The project life cycle for Renaissance proceeded in a top-down fashion, with two years devoted to systems design, development,
and testing, followed by a planned roll-out over two six-month phases in 1994.  A major information systems consulting firm
served as coordinator of the project, overseeing design and implementation.
Rollout of the Renaissance system had begun in early 1994, with initial pilot tests in distribution centers located in Denver and
Kansas City.  The pilot studies revealed some devastating problems.  There were stockouts and mis-shipments of some items.
There were also problems in reconciling orders processed between first and second shifts.  All this resulted in finger-pointing
between Sales, the Purchasing Department, and Warehouses:  they each blamed each other for the problems and they all blamed
the Renaissance system.  Customers were particularly unhappy.  Not only was response time poor, they missed the friendly voice
of an order taker at the local distribution centers—a point of contact to which they had become accustomed.  Overall, there were
disappointing results in manpower savings, overtime requirements, fill rates, sales revenue, and sales margin improvement .  (See
Exhibit H.) 
IMC management was greatly concerned.  VSA was a keystone to its corporate strategy.  Overall, however, Renaissance was not
viewed as a conceptual or strategic mistake; the problem appeared to be extraordinarily poor implementation and misjudgment
as to the computer power and communications capacity required.  The system implementation plan had called for completion of
Renaissance rollout throughout VSA by the end of 1994, but given the problems that developed during the pilot tests, there was
a question as to whether the rollout should proceed as planned.  What could be done to turn this project around?
August 1994
Devendra was confident he could find a solution to the Renaissance problem and renew VSA’s profitability. He was energized
to take on the challenge.  At the same time, he was not sure yet of the exact steps necessary to fix the problem or exactly how he
would get started at that task.  He did know he had to roll up his sleeves and get to work—quickly!
STUDY QUESTIONS
1. If you were Devendra, what would you do during the first two weeks of your new job as CEO of VSA?
2. What are Devendra’s options with regard to the Renaissance system?  What exactly is the problem and what are the solution
options that he should consider? Which option would you recommend to Devendra?
3. Assuming you had a plan for dealing with the Renaissance system problem, how would you implement the plan?  What
























Net Sales                                             
                 1992                                                   1993                                       1994                        
$2.11*              $2.22            $2.22
U.S. Food Service Canadian Foods       Venezuelan Foods
*Excludes North American agribusinessses divested in fiscal 1992
Segment Earnings**                                                                                    ( in millions )
             $78.2 *                                                      $76.6                                                               $68.8
                1992                                                      1993                                              1994                        
 U.S. Food Service            Canadian Foods         Venezuelan Foods
**Before unusual charges of $70 million in fiscal 1994 and $33.9 million in fiscal 1992
(in billions)
Exhibit A
IMC Organization:  1984
Exhibit B
IMC Selected Financial Information:  1992 to 1994



















Director of Field Operations
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Specialty Distribution – VSA, Inc.
1994
Exhibit C-2





Corp. Inventory Control Manager
Vice President - Purchasing
National Sales Manager
Area General Managers




Publications & Sales Manager
National Retail Dev. Manager
Vice President - Marketing
Sales Pricing/Rebate Manager
Telecenter Manager





Marketing Group of VSA













Product Market Share:  1995
Can cold drinks - 2%
Juices - 2%
Bottled Drinks - 7%
Confections/snacks - 18%
All-purpose food - 7%
Pastries - 1%
Hot drinks - 8%
Cigarettes - 6%
Hot canned foods - .4%
Cup cold drinks - 7%
Milk - 2%
Ice Cream - 1%
All other - 3%
Source:  Vending Times, 1994 Census Study
Exhibit D
Information on the Vending Industry
Exhibit E-1
VSA:  Highlights
• Grew substantially from $200 to $900 million through acquisition of regional competitors over a period of eight years.
• The 20 distribution centers operated independently.
• Operating costs were increasing exponentially and profits were declining.
• Gross margins were shrinking as suppliers moved closer to the vend operators.
• The business had become capital intensive with low Return on Investment.
























VSA Historical Sales/Gross Sales
Exhibit E-3
VSA Pretax Profit
































FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95(projected)
Margin % 12.5% 12.3% 12.2% 11.9% 12.0%
Exhibit E-4














FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95*
FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95*
Variable
Cost %























FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94 FY95*
Fixed
Cost %




























Net Receivables 108% 101%
Inventory 106% 101%
Accounts Payable 92% 85%
Fixed Assests 382% 352%
Goodwill 113% 100%













Investment Growth %:  FY 91-95 FY95 Adj.:
Acquisitions
Exhibit E-8
Net Investment Base FY91 to FY95





























1 2 3 4
Mar Aug May Aug Jan
Phase I
Phase II
1 2 3 4
6 month
Phase III
1 2 3 4
6 month
1 = Design project
2 = System development
3 = Testing and refinement





The implementation of Renaissance is clearly a multi-year proposition given the size and scope, the relative magnitude of and
the impact on the business and its organization, and the risk.  Therefore, the implementation schedule of the new systems is
segregated into discrete, logical phases based on VSA’s business priorities.  Each phase is further subdivided into design and
installation projects to provide for management control.  The following schedule identifies the major implementation phases of
Renaissance.  The objective of Phase I is to implement a complete replacement of VSA’s core transaction system architectures
(hardware, software, and communications).  Subsequent Phases II through n provide for the continuous enhancement and




Benefit Annual 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Profit Improvement
   Work Force Reduction (a)
       Sales $2,098
       Purchasing $727
       Operations $1,019
       Administration $1,136
       Corporate ($297)
          Subtotal $4,683 $3,512 $4,683 $4,683 $4,683 $4,683
   Margin Improvement (b)
       Pricing Control $3,500 $1,075 $2,940 $3,500 $3,500 $3,500
       Rebate Management $400 $400 $400 $400 $400 $400
       Inventory Shrinkage $720 $720 $720 $720 $720 $720
          Subtotal $4,620 $2,195 $4,060 $4,620 $4,620 $4,620
Total Benefits $9,303 $5,707 $8,743 $9,303 $9,303 $9,303
   Costs of Renaissance (c)
       Depreciation of Capital $2,020 $2,625 $2,625 $2,625 $2,625
       Ongoing Maintenance $123 $135 $147 $159 $172
       Telecommunications & Circuits $381 $381 $381 $381 $381
       Additional Personnel $740 $841 $861 $881 $901
Total Incremental Costs of Renaissance $3,264 $3,981 $4,014 $4,046 $4,079
Net Benefits $2,443 $4,761 $5,289 $5,257 $5,224
Note(a): Full implementation on 4/25/94. First year projected at 75% of annualized benefits due to learning curve process.
Note(b): First and second year pricing benefits will be less due to bringing system to full utilization.
Note(c): Depreciation projected at 75% for first year due to partial year total utilization.
Exhibit G
Renaissance Benefits
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Description Denver Kansas City
Telesales Manpower
    Prior to implementation 9 people 7 people
    Post implementation 10 people 8 people
Warehouse Manpower
    August, 93 37 people 27 people
    August, 94 42 people 24 people
Warehouse Overtime (as % of total payroll)
    June to August, 93 5.70% 8.69%
    June to August, 94 10.15% 10.79%
% Fill Rate
    Prior to implementation (estimated) 2% 2%
    Post implementation (last week) 5.91% 2.58%
Margin Improvement None or Negative None or Negative
Inventory Turns
    June to August, 93 12.41 12.92
    June to August, 94 8.2 8.75
Sales Dollars
    % change in sales (June to August, 93 vs 94) -4.30% -6.30%
Exhibit H
Assessment of Pilots (August 1994)
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3This case was developed by Robert M. Price and Gerardine DeSanctis for instructional purposes only and is not presented as an evaluation
of management practice.  Copyright © 1999 Fuqua School of Business.  Do not copy without permission.  Revised July 21, 1999.
4A Note on the Role of “Brokers”—The vend operator, broker, and distributor were linked as follows.  The broker represented various food
manufacturers.  In theory, brokers and vend operators acted independently and separately they would “choose” a distributor to deliver the
product.  In practice, brokers naturally wanted to get the most convenient and comprehensive distributor for their vend client. Thus, if the
distributor and broker had good relations, the broker was as much a sales agent for the distributor as for the manufacturer being represented.
The broker-distributor relations were developed and maintained at the local Distribution Center level.  This meant that a Distribution Center
General Manager had, in effect, three sales forces:  the telesales operation by means of which most orders were entered, the brokers who could
designate the center General Manager as the distributor, and a few direct sales people who called on large accounts.
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International Multifoods3 – B
This case covers the period August 1994 – May 1996
DEVENDRA ARRIVES AT VSA
The Renaissance system was in the midst of its rollout when Devendra arrived as CEO of VSA.  The results of the first two pilot
tests had revealed a host of problems.  There were two clear alternative courses of action with regard to Renaissance: (1) scratch
the system altogether and start over or (2) modify the system and/or the implementation plan in order to enhance the chances of
success.  Option #1 was never seriously considered since the prevailing view was that it was implementation, not design or
architecture, that was the problem.  Further, writing off the $20 million involved in option #1 was unattractive to IMC
management given the company’s recent financial performance.
Devendra saw option #2 as the most viable alternative and he quickly set to work on leading a systems modification effort and
developing a new rollout schedule.  He started the process of replacing top managers with new people that he believed could lead
the repair of Renaissance and the revitalization of VSA.  He also did a careful analysis of the system and pilot test results and,
in consultation with key managers and the Renaissance project team concluded that the key problems with the system were as
follows:
• The system performance was inadequate in terms of customer wait time and order processing cycle.
• Critical components of the system could not be implemented because of system overload.  Greater system capacity, in terms
of storage and processing capacity, was needed.
• Data integrity was at 70% accuracy instead of the desired rate of 99.99% accuracy.
• The system was overly complex and in need of simplification.
Customers were experiencing unacceptable telephone wait time, order taking errors, stockouts, pricing errors, and service
unreliability.  These systems problems were particularly vexing to VSA’s small independent customers who accounted for 65%
of VSA’s revenue.  A survey of these customers revealed complaints about mis-shipments, stockouts, and loss of a telephone
customer service representative who they knew on a first-name basis.  To make matters worse, local brokers4 were becoming
alienated because of the centralization of purchasing inherent in Renaissance.  There was also dissatisfaction with the new price
book (product catalog), which was customer unfriendly, error-prone, and confusing.
Devendra informed IMC management that “significant incremental investment and effort was required to transform the system
from being internally focused to being customer driven” and he set about leading the Renaissance team to make the necessary
changes to restore successful implementation of the system.
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The plan was to “re-engineer Renaissance” and the steps involved included those shown in Exhibit A.  The fundamental
architecture was not to be changed; rather, efforts were directed toward simplifying the system design, improving data integrity,
and enhancing the system’s basic computing and telecommunications power.
Meanwhile, the loss of sales and many pressures associated with Renaissance were resulting in growing morale problems as VSA.
Many division general managers were leaving the company, project team members were frustrated, and some top managers, many
of whom were newly hired by Devendra, were starting to question everything from the Renaissance system to the management
of the company itself.
IMC management regarded the Renaissance system as absolutely critical to VSA success.  No IMC managers were on the project
team; however, following Devendra’s hiring, IMC management kept in closer contact with the project and the developing morale
problems at VSA.  Bob Maddocks visited the VSA Denver office twice a month to review VSA status and offer advice and
support to Devendra.  IMC management was careful not to meddle in the details of the project or actively interfere with
Devendra’s operations.  Some VSA managers interpreted IMC’s distance as indicating indifference or lack of support.  An
undercurrent of tension was brewing, with IMC management feeling that the VSA people did not want corporate interference and
VSA management feeling that IMC management didn’t want to get involved with the project. 
DIFFICULTIES AT IMC
IMC was also confronting other strategic and financial struggles during this time.  The company had been through a series of
strategic repositioning over the course of a decade and had experienced erratic financial success over those years.  FY 1994
operating results were very poor.  The company lacked a steady, profitable outlook and pressure to improve the firm’s financial
performance was mounting from both the board and the financial community.  FY 1995 got underway on March 1, 1994.  A
critical issue was the search for a consistent, long-term strategy.
IMC’s financial advisors suggested that the company separate into two businesses:  the distribution business and the food business,
which comprised North American Bakery, Canada Consumer Foods, and Venezuela Foods (MONACA).  Food Service
Distribution businesses enjoyed a higher price-to-earnings ratios.  Further, separation of business types would allow each to focus
on “core competencies,” which would provide both internal value as well as external confidence.  Although IMC management
took this advice seriously, several forces prevented action toward a spin-off.
First, in 1994, IMC was in the process of acquiring the distribution business of the Laprino Company.  This business was to be
combined with Pueringer to form what would be known as Multifoods Specialty Division, leading to all the problems inherent
in merging two operations.  This merger, coupled with the cash consuming requirements of Renaissance at VSA, made it clear
that the distribution business was not strong enough to stand alone.   For FY 1994, Food Service Distribution had total operating
earnings of only $7 million; for FY 1995, operating earnings would be $11.3 million.
Complicating IMC’s situation further were the economic problems in Venezuela where the company’s subsidiary, MONACA,
was located.  Although MONACA was a solid business, being the second largest food company in the country and in the top ten
overall, the country’s economic problems made MONACA’s contribution in dollar terms unpredictable and somewhat volatile.
In the fourth quarter of FY 1994 (ending February 28, 1994), because of the rate of inflation in Venezuela, it was necessary for
IMC to adopt “highly inflationary accounting” for MONACA.  This meant, among other things, that exchange losses due to
inflation had to be taken directly to the operating statement rather than simply be accounted for as balance sheet transactions.
The effect on MONACA’s FY 1994 earnings was modest, since the change was limited to results for the fourth quarter.  Even
so, MONACA’s operating earnings declined 4.7% from $25.5 million in FY 93 to $24.3 million in FY 1994.  But the effect in
FY 1995 was to be an 18% further decline to $19.9 million.  All this was further compounded in June of 1994 by the fact that the
Venezuelan government, in spite of raging inflation, froze the official exchange rate at 170 bolivars to the dollar.  The government
also made all exchange of bolivars into foreign currency subject to government approval.  This would affect the payment of
dividends by MONACA to its parent IMC.
Meanwhile, IMC’s bakery business and Canadian subsidiary were growing only modestly.  U.S. bakery margins were lowered
by rising wheat costs that affected the cost of flour, a primary ingredient.  Write-downs in the meats business and other unusual
items brought a $17.2 million operating loss in the U.S. food service segment in FY 1994.  Also in that fiscal year, Canadian
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Foods sales decreased 3%.  In total, including write-downs and unusual items of $19.4 million, these businesses had an operating
loss of $9.9 million.
By the end of FY 1995, IMC had evolved into four major businesses:  food service distribution in the U.S., bakery products in
North America, consumer food products in Canada, and basic foods in Venezuela.  Consolidated operating earnings per share,
exclusive of unusual items such as sales of some businesses, declined from 1.86 EPS in FY 1994 to 1.55 EPS.  The right long term
strategy seemed to be elusive.  Nevertheless hopes were high for improved results in FY 1996.
FY 1996:  A DIFFICULT YEAR FOR IMC AND VSA
In February of 1995, Devendra made an impressive presentation to the IMC board.  Reviewing the status of the industry, the
company, the Renaissance project, and changes that were planned, he communicated a thorough understanding of the business
and showed a careful analysis that gave the board confidence in the new CEO of VSA.  But as FY 1996 got underway, an
immediate improvement in Renaissance or VSA was not evident.
Inside VSA, however, the human resource problems were mounting.  Management turnover in the Distribution Centers was
increasing.  There was a divisive atmosphere brewing as departments and functions feuded over the source of problems and
responsibility for change.  Many managers felt frustrated and over-worked.  Despite Devendra’s best attempts, problems with
Renaissance and VSA as a whole continued.  Morale problems grew and Devendra became frustrated and had difficulty managing
and supporting his staff.  Many of the new managers that Devendra had brought on board were getting frustrated.  Some were
on the verge of leaving the company.
VSA’s pretax operating earnings for FY 1996 were $10 million, and sales declined 1%, due to the continuing loss of the small
independent vending operator accounts.
There was little solace for IMC management as they looked at other parts of the company’s business.  In June 1995, because
Venezuela’s wild inflation continued unabated, rather than use the official exchange rate of 170 bolivars to the dollar, companies
began using exchange rates based on the so called “Brady Bond” rate.  IMC began this practice in August 1995 (the start of the
third quarter of its fiscal year 1996).  The “Brady Bond” rate was a proxy for what a free market exchange rate would have been.
It was 228 in August 1995 and by February 28, 1996, had reached 470.  In effect, in six months the rate at which bolivars were
translated into dollars had gone from 170 to 470.  In spite of this, MONACA’s dollar denominated results for FY 96 only declined
$800,000 (4%) to $19.1 million.
Producing these results in the midst of such extreme economic turmoil indicated a good basic business at MONACA and careful
management within government constraints.  But IMC was in no position to ride unperturbed through such uncertainty.
MONACA was viewed more and more as a liability by people outside the company.  On the other hand, it was not at all clear
that the company could realize enough money from the sale of MONACA to replace its earnings contribution to IMC’s overall
results.  Still, rumors persisted that the Company would have to dispose of MONACA and the “bottom fishers” gathered.
Of the two remaining IMC businesses, only the Canada consumer segment was a good performer.  Its marketing was strong.
“Robin Hood” was a powerful brand name in grain-based consumer foods and “Bick’s” was well positioned in the condiments
segment.  North American Bakery had a good market position in bakery mixes, but with marginal competitive differentiation,
good returns were difficult to achieve.  The fledgling frozen bakery mix business did not have critical mass and was operating
at a loss.
IMC’s earnings for FY 1996 ending February 28, 1996, were a disappointing $1.33 per share.  Before unusual gains, the
company’s earnings were $1.31 per share compared (on the same basis) to $1.55 in FY ‘95 and $1.86 in FY ‘94.  The company
appeared to be in a reverse gear.  As the company entered FY ‘97, on March 1, 1996, the strategy issue had become, to use nuclear
energy terminology, “supercritical.”  Before the first quarter ended, Tony Luiso resigned as chief executive officer. 
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MAY 1996:  ENTER BOB PRICE
With the departure of Luiso and ongoing financial struggles, Bob Price, a member of the IMC Board of Directors, was drafted
by the board to serve as interim CEO.  Price had been CEO of the computer company, Control Data Corporation, during the
1980s, and he had a strong reputation for corporate leadership in the face of crisis.  He had served on numerous corporate boards,
lived in the Minneapolis area, and knew IMC quite well.  Further, he was willing to take on the task on a temporary basis until
a new CEO could be recruited.
He was taking over a company that now consisted of five profit centers:  Bakery, Canadian Consumer Foods, MONACA in
Venezuela, Multifoods Specialty Distribution (MSD), and VSA. It was not to be. IMC and VSA organization charts are shown
in Exhibit B.
It was late in the evening on a Thursday night in May that Price agreed to take on the task at IMC.  He would start his new post
on Monday morning, just three days away, and he was thinking about the work ahead.  Most importantly, he was pondering his
priorities.  To get started in his new post, he needed a plan, and he needed it quickly!
STUDY QUESTIONS
1. If you were Bob Price, what would you do during the first two weeks of your new job as CEO of IMC?
2. What are IMC’s strategic alternatives at this point and which alternative should it pursue?




REENGINEERING RENAISSANCE  PRIOR TO ROLL OUT RESUMPTION
1. Additional fact finding and environment improvement
– Feedback from customers through a survey
– Feedback from employees survey
– Establishment of routine communication link with employees
– Customer communication regarding roll out plans and benefits
– Commencement of the creation of a customer-driven culture
2. Alignment of the sales and the operations organization
3. Business simplification




4. Data integrity establishment
– Centralized Management
– Elimination of Inactive Data
6. Adequate staffing and upgrade of the centralized functions
– Accounts Receivable
– Accounts Payable
– Purchasing (Core Items)
7. Critical Skills Upgrade
– Inventory Management
– Logistics
8. Training of Employees
9. Transformation of the Telephone System ID Calling
10. Operation System Simplification to Achieve Speed
11. System architecture Improvement for Speed and Reliability
12. Rigid Inventory Control in Distribution Centers
13. Customer Service in Distribution Centers
14. Logistics Management in Regions
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